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Abstract
The utilization of 3D printing technology within
the manufacturing process creates an environment
that is potentially conducive to malicious activity.
Previous research in 3D printing focused on attack
vector identification and intellectual property
protection. This research develops and implements
malicious code using Printrbot’s branch of the open
source Marlin 3D printer firmware. Implementations
of the malicious code were activated based on a
specified printer command sent from a desktop
application. The malicious firmware successfully
ignored incoming print commands for a printed 3D
model, substituted malicious print commands for an
alternate 3D model, and manipulated extruder feed
rates. The research contribution is three-fold. First,
this research provides an initial assessment of
potential effects malicious firmware can have on a
3D printed object. Second, it documents a potential
vulnerability that impacts 3D product output using
3D printer firmware. Third, it provides foundational
grounding for future research in malicious 3D
printing process activities.

1. Introduction
Three-dimensional (3D) printing capabilities
present intriguing opportunities for businesses in
today’s globally networked environment. 3D printers
operate by fusing successive layers, with varying
degrees of layer thickness, to produce 3D objects
[18]. The ability to print objects on demand
potentially provides organizations with the ability to
develop custom, cost effective components for a
variety of purposes [3]. A PriceWaterhouseCoopers
(PwC) report indicates that, approximately, 71% of
manufactures in the US are implementing 3D printing
in some form or fashion [23]. The report goes on to
indicate that 42% believe that 3D printing will be
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implemented in high volume production settings in
the ensuing three to five years.
As the use of 3D printers and their components
grows, industry impact is already visible in several
industries [3]. A Wohlers Associates report states
that, in 2015, the 3D printing industry (a.k.a.
Additive Manufacturing or AM) accounted for
$5.165 billion of revenue, with 32.5% of all AMmanufactured objects used as functional parts [29].
The integration of 3D printing is observable in
aviation, medical and manufacturing industries [11,
16, 29]. In the aviation industry, Airbus is
experimenting with the use of metal 3D printers in
their manufacturing process [29]. General Electric is
already producing fuel nozzles for a jet engine that is
scheduled to be available in 2016 [17]. NASA is
incorporating 3D printing into its space program in
order to build components on an as-needed basis [6].
The medical field is exploring the use of 3D printed
scaffolds for bone tissue engineering [9, 16]. From a
manufacturing perspective, Ford announced that they
have created 500,000 parts in the last few decades
using 3D printers for the purposes of rapid
prototyping [11, 20]. The use of 3D printers in rapid
prototyping has prompted the idea that 3D printing
will lead to rapid production environments [2]. In
addition, the integration of 3D printers into all
aspects of society has stimulated debates in regard to
the overall geopolitical and socioeconomic impact of
these devices [7, 21, 24].
With the continued assimilation of 3D printers
into manufacturing scenarios, it is plausible that the
escalating importance of these devices will provide
motivation for attackers along with creating new
attack surface opportunities. This is similar to
integration issues and residual data risk experienced
with other digital devices in business environments
[15]. The ramifications of these compromises range
from physical damage to the 3D printer, to theft of
intellectual property, to physically harming the
operator, to sabotage of the production product [31].
Prospective attack vectors for 3D printers and
associated printer components include consumer
applications used to interact with the printer, 3D
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model files, the communication architecture use to
pass commands to the 3D printer and the firmware.
[26, 27]. Due to the data flow of the 3D printing
process, the firmware is a piece of software that
controls the 3D printer and, as such, is the final piece
of software involved in manufacturing process.
The potential magnitude of a compromise coupled
with an understanding of the inherent data flow in a
3D printer prompted the hypothesis that a 3D
printer’s firmware can be maliciously modified so
that it negatively impacts printed objects. To explore
this hypothesis several research questions were
identified:
1. Is open source data available to assist in
modifying the 3D printer firmware?
2. How does the 3D printer firmware interpret and
execute received commands?
3. What effect can manipulation of the commands
have on the printed model?
The research contribution is three-fold. First, this
research provides an initial assessment of potential
effects malicious firmware can have on the 3D
printed object. Second, it documents a, potential,
vulnerability that impacts 3D product output using
Marlin firmware. Third, it provides the foundation for
future areas of research involving firmware
manipulation. The paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 discusses relevant research in 3D printer
security. Section 3 describes the methodology and
experimental design to evaluate the research
questions. Section 4 discusses implementation and
results. Section 5 discusses conclusions gathered
from the conducted experiment and section 6
identifies areas for future research.

2. Literature review
As the proliferation of 3D printers escalates, it
stands to reason that the number and various types of
attacks will increase. Recent research indicates that
the introduction and impact of residual data extracted
from digital devices is continuing to escalate in legal
atmospheres [4, 19]. This situation emphasizes the
necessity to understand how a devise can be
compromised along with effective mitigation
strategies for the production product and the
intellectual property.
So far, two major security threat categories have
been identified for 3D printing in the literature:
violation of Intellectual Property (IP) and ability to
inflict physical damage, e.g., via a sabotage of a
manufactured part’s quality.
Yamploskiy, et al., [30] express a need to expand
intellectual property protection beyond the 3D model

and incorporate all 3D printing parameters involved
in the printing process. This is due to the unique
effects printing parameters have on the structural
properties of the printed object.
Brown, et al., [5] analyze legal aspects of IP
protection in AM. Based on current US law, the
authors discuss whether and to what extent patent,
copyright, and trademark protection can be applied to
blueprint, process, printed object, and design on
object. While some protection can be offered by the
existing legal framework, the authors identify
numerous limitations. For instance, a 3D scan of a
manufactured object is not considered an original
technical drawing (blueprint); thus it can be used to
legally avoid copyright protection of a blueprint.
From an attack perspective, Faruque, et al., [10]
present the first side-channel attack on a 3D printer.
The authors show how acoustic emanations of a
desktop 3D printer can be used to reconstruct the
printed object’s geometry. The authors report an
average accuracy for axis prediction of 78.35% and
an average length prediction error of 17.82%. In the
follow-up poster and technical report [8], the authors
analyze a video feed from a thermal imaging camera
in an attempt to measure and reproduce the print bed
and nozzle movements of a 3D printer, from which a
complete design specification can be derived.
Turner, et al. [27] analyzed the manufacturing
tool chain in AM and found several attack vectors
that can be easily exploited. The authors have
examined the lack of integrity checks when receiving
the design (common non-secure mechanisms include
email and USB drives), the lack of physical security
on machining tools, and the exposure to common
network attacks. The authors note the difficulty of
relying on the quality control process because it is
expensive and not tailored for detection of
cybersecurity attacks.
Yampolskiy, et al., [31] present on an extensive
survey of AM related material science literature and
discuss which manufacturing parameters can have a
negative impact on the quality of manufactured parts.
The discussion focuses on AM with metals and alloys
and covers a variety of AM processes, including
power bed fusion, direct energy deposition, and sheet
lamination. The identified parameters include but are
not limited to build direction, scanning strategy, heat
source energy, etc. The researchers identify the
following cyber and physical attack vectors
categories: malicious software and firmware,
malicious 3D models, and the physical supply chain.
Yampolskiy, et al., [32] generalizes the ability to
sabotage AM as the weaponization of 3D printing.
The authors propose a framework for the analysis of
attacks involving AM and then then discuss how
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certain categories of attacks can generate effects
comparable with those produced by weapons (e.g.,
kinetic damage). Further, the authors argue that the
targets of such an attack can be 3D manufactured
objects, AM equipment or environments.
Sturm, et al., [26] discuss that, during the
transition through the AM process chain, the
description of the object geometry is used by various
tools that change its representation. Any of these
representations can be corrupted, e.g., the interior of
a part can be altered without affecting its exterior
shape. The authors then use malware to alter the
STereoLithography (STL) file containing the object’s
geometry. The experiments described in the paper
focus on the introduction of voids (i.e., internal
cavities) in the STL file. This attack takes into
account the location of the void, its shape, its size,
and whether it is fully enclosed. The authors vary
these parameters to experimentally evaluate the
impact of a void placed inside of a part on its quality.
The authors then provide an experimental proof that
the part-quality can be reduced by injection of the
voids in its design.
Zeltmann, et al., [33] investigate the impact on
tensile strength of two types of manufacturing
modifications, sub-millimeter scale defects in the
interior of 3D printed parts, and orientation of the
part during printing. For the first defect type, cubic
defects in three sizes were introduced by replacing
main material with a contaminant. For the second
analyzed defect type, the authors performed tensile
test experiments on objects printed with three
different orientations. Their experiments confirm that
these manipulations can impact a printed part’s
physical characteristics.
Current research not only highlights growing
interest in cyber-physical systems but also more
specific concerns focusing on 3D printer security.
However, there is, currently, minimal research
investigating the effects of malicious firmware on the
3D printing process.

3. Methodology
This research’s high-level problems statement
investigates the ability to develop malicious 3D
printer firmware to compromise printed objects. The
approach utilized in this research is an initial pass at
an implementation of a design science methodology
as defined by Peffers, et. al., [22]. The refinement of
the problem statement identified the main objective
of the research. The objective focused on malicious
firmware development designed to modify a 3D
printer’s behavior to ignore incoming commands and

execute its predefined commands. The printer
equipment utilized in this research was a Printrbot
3D printer (model 1404) running Marlin Firmware
(version: 1.0.0 bedlevel metal-simple) [12]. The
firmware was selected due to the open-source
availability of the source code. Modification to the
firmware were implemented using an Arduino IDE
[1]. Printrbots (version 2.0.1) firmware update tool
was used to flash the printer with new firmware [13].
The desktop software used to communicate print
commands with the 3D printer is a Repetier-Host
(version 0.56) running on a Macbook Pro. The
development and experimental environment is
illustrated in Figure 1 - Environment.
The design and development started with an
investigation of the control flow and format of
commands handled by the firmware. To achieve this,
the source code for Printrbot’s Marlin Firmware
(version:
1.0.0
bedlevel_metal-simple)
was
downloaded, compiled and flashed to the 3D printer
following Printrbot’s community instructions [12].
Upon validation of the newly flashed firmware, a
further review of the communication protocol was
performed to identify data that is translated into
specific 3D printer actions.

Figure 1. Environment
The communication investigation used RepetierHost software which is a desktop application that
communicates with the 3D printer through a G-code
protocol [25]. G-code (a.k.a. RS-274) is a Numerical
Control (NC) programming language used to specify
hardware parameters that is commonly used to
control computer-aided manufacturing. In the case of
3D printers, it can be used to specify parameters like
temperature, the extruder speed and movement along
the x, y, and z axis. [27].
According to an examination of the Marlin source
code and associated documentation, incoming
commands are transferred via USB or through an
onboard SD card [12]. The Marlin firmware is
structured to utilize a repetitive loop method that
periodically checks for serial input. To determine the
command process flow, a manual code review was
performed tracing the path of incoming G-code
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commands from reception to execution. It was found
that while the firmware uses sequential numbering
and check sums to validate incoming commands from
the desktop application before processing, it is
possible to bypass this functionality by directly
updating private variables with desired hardware
parameters values.
To validate the format used for data transfer USB
packet capture was performed using USBPcap with
Wireshark during a test print [14, 28]. Based on the
data gathered from the packet capture and the
firmware’s documentation, G-code and USB were
chosen as identifiers of functions within the firmware
that effect the control flow process
The investigation of the printer’s source code and
functionality resulted in the design and development
of malicious Marlin firmware. The malicious
behavior is activated by an external command. A
corresponding boolean variable is set to true when
the command to turn on the extruder fan is received.
The extruder fan was chosen as a trigger due to its
common activation when print jobs are initiated. The
analysis of the source code indicates that an effective
placement of the trigger was in the void
‘process_commands’ function. It also indicated that
the alternate control path should be inserted into the
loop located in the ‘main’ function. The alternate
control path subverts control flow during the print
process to a malicious block of code. The purpose of
the diversion is to produce alternative output or
manipulate the values of valid commands in order to
increase or decrease the rate of material extruded. In
the presented work, two versions of the firmware
were developed. One version subverted control flow
of the firmware and another version manipulated a
variable that is used to impact the extruder feed rate.
For the version of the firmware that impacts
control flow, a trigger needs to be inserted into the
code and the control paths had to be modified. The
next step added the values needed to print a substitute
model and manipulate valid print commands into the
firmware. The G-code command values needed for
the alternative model were hardcoded into the
firmware as array variables. Five arrays were created
to store the values needed to print the pyramid model.
Three arrays were used to store values corresponding
to the x, y, and z axis positions. The creation of two
arrays containing extruder rate and feed rate values
were necessary for printing. Lastly, a counter variable
was used to iterate through all of the arrays.
For the version of the firmware that impacts the
extruder feed rate, a trigger needed to be inserted into
the code and a variable was added to the
‘plan_buffer_line’ function call for rate manipulation.
This variable is used to increase the current extruder

rate by an increment ranging from 10% to 40%. The
default value of the variable is one, representing a
zero percent increase. When the G-code command
M106 is processed by the 3D printer, the variable is
set to a value between 1.1 and 1.4.
The demonstration of the modified firmware is
segmented into six distinct experiments that issue six
identical print requests from the Repetier-Host
application. Each experiment has its own firmware
version and a unique ID. The version specific to an
individual experiment is flashed to the printer prior to
running the experiment. The version of the
firmware’s unique ID is visually validated prior to
executing the experiment.
The first experiment issues a print job from the
Repetier-Host application using an unmodified
version of the firmware. At this point, the necessary
information was sent to the printer via a USB
connection to print the cube. The purpose of this
experiment is to ensure that the printer is functioning
properly.
For the second experiment, a print job was issued
using a modified version of the firmware that has
been flashed to the printer. When triggered, this
version of the firmware prints alterative output. The
necessary information is sent to the printer via a USB
connection to print the cube.
The third, fourth, fifth and sixth experiments issue
print jobs that execute modified firmware following
the same execution protocol as the previously
discussed. The series of experiments starting with the
third print request is designed to manipulate the
extruder feed rate to a precise increment. The third
experiment sets the extruder feed rate to 1.1. Each
sequential printing experiment increased the
extrusion rate by 10%. The result of each print is
evaluated through a visual inspection and a
comparison to the print job specified by the RepetierHost application.
It should be noted that for the purposes of this
research, investigation of the delivery mechanism and
installation processes for the malicious firmware onto
the 3D printer are considered out of scope. This
research also focuses solely on USB communication
with the printer.

4. Implementation and results
The details of this research is presented in three
segments: examination, implementation and results.
The examination section details communication
protocol characteristics. The implementation section
describes modifications made to the Marlin firmware.

6092

Lastly, the results section examines experimental
findings.

temperature values for both the extruder and print
bed. An example of the G-code format is presented in
Figure 4 – G-code Format.

4.1 Examination
The G-code protocol is the only supported form
of communication for sending commands and status
information between the Repeiter-Host application
and the 3D printer. An inspection of the USB packets
identified the format for commands sent to the 3D
printer as G-code syntax. The result of a packet
capture is illustrated in Figure 2 – USB g-code packet
capture. A G-code command in the captured packet is
highlighted in the figure. This command activates the
extruder fan.

Figure 2. USB g-code packet capture
The documentation retrieved from GitHub
revealed that the Marlin firmware runs on an Arduino
board and is written in C++ [12]. The functionality of
the firmware is controlled in an infinite loop located
in the ‘main’ function. The ‘loop’ function processes
the received G-code commands. The ‘loop’ utilizes
get and process command functions. This function is
displayed in Figure 3 - Unmodified control loop.

Figure 3. Unmodified control loop
The Marlin firmware processes the incoming Gcode in three steps. The first step is handled by an ‘if
statement’ that continually checks to see if the input
command buffer is full. If it is not full, the firmware
checks for incoming data received via USB.
For the second step, within the ‘get_command’
function, the firmware then parses the G-code packet
to retrieve the command parameters. Parameters sent
using G-code can include the axis values for the x, y,
and z plane, filament and extruder rate along with the

Figure 4. G-code format
During the parsing, the firmware validates that the
incoming command is in sequential order based on
previously executed G-code. Upon validation, the
parameters are stored in private variables for later
processing. If the command does not have a valid
sequence number, an error will be reported and the
command will not be executed. Lastly, the
‘process_commands’ function will process validated
commands utilizing the values stored in the
aforementioned private variables and invoking the
‘plan_buffer_line’ function shown in Figure 5 –
Process commands function.

Figure 5. Process commands function
The outlined organization of incoming command
processing enables execution of an arbitrary G-code
command sequence via a comparatively simple
modification of firmware. Thus, this modification
effectively bypasses any restrictions and security
measures that might be incorporated into the
communication
protocol
by
invoking
the
‘plan_buffer_line’ function directly within the
modified control loop. Directly calling this function
circumvents integrity checks normally performed on
incoming G-code commands. Figure 6 - Private
control variables display the private variables used to
store parameters needed to execute the next
command. The destination array stores the values for
x, y, and z axis movements. The ‘feedrate’ variable
stores the current filament rate for printing. The ‘Gcode_N’ variable tracks the current command
number for sequential processing. Modification of Gcode_N was not needed for this experiment. The
security measure, to execute commands in order, is
bypassed by utilizing the ‘plan_buffer_line’ within
the ‘process commands’ function as illustrated in
Figure 5.
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Figure 6. Private control variables

4.2 Implementation

Figure 9. Malicious parameter values
A full example of the code can be found in Figure
10 – Malicious control loop.

In the implementation experiment, a user initiates
a print job as usual. When the modified firmware
receives the M106 command, it sets the Boolean
‘attack’ variable to true. The code for the trigger flag
is available in Figure 7 – Boolean flag.

Figure 7. Boolean flag
Two categories of attack were used to modify the
model printed by the 3D printer. The first category
involves subverting program control through the use
of a loop that executes commands to print an
alternative model. The second category modifies a
variable that will increase the rate at which the
filament is extruded during the printing process. In
order to submit malicious commands for technique
one, G-code was created for a pyramid model,
illustrated in Figure 8 – Pyramid model, using the
Repetier-Host application.

Figure 8. Pyramid model
The parameters contained within the generated Gcode were then hard coded into corresponding arrays
within the malicious firmware. There was a total of
152 commands needed to print the pyramid model.
Figure 9 – Malicious parameter values shows the
section of code where values for parameters are
stored.
Upon activating the trigger, the firmware will
subvert the control flow to a malicious function that
is hardcoded within the main loop.

Figure 10. Malicious control loop
In this function, a ‘while’ loop iterates through a
sequence of 152 individual commands (stored in five
arrays) and updates variables controlling the next
action to be executed. For each pre-stored command,
once the variables have been updated, the firmware
directly calls the ‘plan_buffer_line’ method that
executes the specified action. After finishing the last
commands, the ‘attack’ variable is set to false, thus
restoring benign control flow.
The second category of attack is also triggered by
the command M106, as displayed in Figure 11 – Rate
value. When this command is received the variable
‘malicious_rate’ is changed from 1 to one of the
following values: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. This variable
controls a malicious increment of the extruder feed
rate, ranging from 10% to 40%.
The malicious firmware modifications for the first
category of attack are placed above the trusted
control loop code found in Figure 3 – Unmodified
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control loop. This code simply diverts control flow
upon the triggering of a boolean flag. The firmware
modification for the second attack is implemented in
the same manner along with changing the
‘plan_buffer_line’ function parameters.

Figure 11. Rate Value
The ‘malicious_rate’ variable is then programmed
into the ‘plan_buffer_line’ function, found in Figure
12 – Modified plan_buffer_line, which is utilized to
print valid commands communicated to the 3D
printer.

Figure 12. Modified plan_buffer_line

4.3 Results
The modified firmware was installed on the 3D
printer replacing previous versions of the software. It
should be noted that this did not impact printer
properties as these are stored in the Repetier-Host
application. The modified firmware was 198 KB in
size and required six minutes to install. Each print
test took an average of two minutes to complete.
4.3.1 Unmodified Firmware Control Test. The 3D
printer was flashed using an unmodified version of
the Marlin firmware. The 3D printer was then
connected to a desktop computer running RepetierHost. Using Repetier-Host, the cube model is
uploaded, as illustrated in Figure 13 – Test cube
model and processed to generate the corresponding
G-code commands that are needed for printing the
object. The print process is then executed using
Repetier-Host. The model printed by the 3D printer
should match the model uploaded to Repetier-Host.

Figure 14 – Actual model, depicts the actual
printed product using the valid firmware. The first
print utilizes the unmodified software functioned as
expected. The cube model processed by RepetierHost matches the cube model that was printed.

Figure 13. Test cube model

Figure 14. Actual Printed Model
During execution of the first test print involving
the unmodified firmware, acknowledgment logs are
continually sent back to the Repetier-Host
application. These acknowledgments continually
verify the printer is connected, returns hardware
values such as current position, temperature, and fan
speed.
The
mechanism
for
sending
the
acknowledgment logs are maintained within the
‘get_commands’ function. The log information that is
sent back during verification contains the command
sequence number and a checksum verification to
ensure the command is trusted and not out of order.
4.3.2 Modified Firmware Substituted Model. The
3D printer was re-flashed using a modified version of
firmware. The modifications in this version of the
firmware included a trigger on the M106 command
that subverts control flow, a while loop directly
invokes hardcoded machine commands, and
hardcoded parameter values that correspond to the
generated G-code from the pyramid model.
Following the same steps as before, the RepetierHost is connected to the 3D printer and used to
process the cube model. During the processing of the
model, the specific G-code required to print the
object is generated. A selection of G-code generated
from the cube is shown in Figure 15 – Generated G-
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code. The trigger command is highlighted in the
illustrated G-code.
After the model has been processed, the print job
is started by the Repetier-Host. The model printed by
the 3D printer should correspond to the pyramid
model, while the model displayed by Repetier-Host
should be that of the cube.

Figure 15. Generated g-code
A screen shot of the Repetier-Host application is
available in Figure 16 – Expected print model. An
image of the printed object is available in Figure 17 –
Actual model. The object printed utilizing the
malicious firmware installed on the 3D printer
provides a visual indicator that the malicious
malware is working. During this test execution, no
logs were received beyond the acknowledgment log
for the M106 command. This is because the modified
firmware operates directly with the function that
controls hardware movement once the trigger has
been set.

the previous steps, the Repetier-Host was connected
to the 3D printer and used to process the cube model.
Subsequent to processing the model and G-code
generation, the print job is started by the RepetierHost. According to the Repetier-Host, the model
printed by the 3D printer should be the cube model.
However, the modified firmware should consume
more material for the same dimensioned model.

Figure 17. Actual model
Four print jobs were executed using this
technique. Prints using 10% to 30% more material
successfully completed printing, but displayed visual
deformities. The results of this output along with the
original cube with no modifications are represented
in Figure 18 – Extruder rate increment 0% to 30%.

Figure 16. Expected print model
While the print job did complete, operators
monitoring the desktop application can notice a lack
of log files. In this scenario, the lack of log files and
the resulting pyramid model printed are indicators
that could reveal malicious activities.

Figure 18. Extruder rate increment 0% to 30%
The print job using 40% more material caused
excess material to accumulate around the extruder
nozzle, causing the extruder to dislodge the model
from the print bed. The output at 40% is illustrated in
Figure 19 – Extruder rate 40%.
During the execution of experimental prints
involving extruder rate manipulation, logs were
received as expected from normal operation. This is
because the firmware modified to achieve this result
is logically located after the validity checks
performed on the commands.

4.3.3 Modified Firmware Extruder Rate. The 3D
printer was re-flashed using a modified version of
firmware. The modifications in this version of the
firmware included a trigger on the M106 command
that sets the ‘malicious_rate’ variable to a predefined
value. Four new prints were executed using this
version of the modified firmware. Each print
corresponds to the values chosen for the
‘malicious_rate’ variable which incrementally
increased the feed rate from 10% to 40%. Following

Figure 19. Extruder rate 40%
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5. Conclusion
The escalation of 3D printing in industry is
prompting interest in security research in both
industry and academia. The results generated from
this research provides insight to the proposed
research questions. In reference to the first question,
open source data is available to assist with modifying
3D printer firmware. The project acquired attack
ideas from relevant literature, modified Marlin
firmware source code and used an open source
firmware tool to deploy the code.
In reference to the second question, the code
analysis helped to identify a vulnerability in how the
firmware interacts with variables. The malicious
firmware developed in this research bypassed the
firmware’s validation process by directly updating
private variables. This allowed the malicious
firmware to effectively modify the output.
In regard to the third question, the experiment
used a G-code command that is commonly used by
the software in the experiment to trigger malicious
behavior. In this case, the trigger was a call to the
extruder fan. The manipulation of the extruder rate,
in this research, had a blatant impact on the product
along with creating an absence of logging output. It is
plausible that in a production environment output
could be modified that is not easily perceptible to the
human eye. Modification of this nature could
potentially have catastrophic outcomes when 3D
printed products are used in safety critical systems.
Hence, the results from this experiment support
the hypothesis that a 3D printer’s firmware can be
maliciously modified so that it negatively impacts
printed objects. The malicious firmware developed in
this experiment subverted control flow to print a
substitute model and modified valid commands to
increase the volume of material used in the printing
process. The data points identified in this research
provide an initial foundation for future firmware
investigation. It also provides the ground work for
future research into acquiring a more in-depth
understanding of 3D printer vulnerabilities along
with the potential impact that these compromises
have on production products.

6. Future work
Future research will examine more sophisticated
malicious modifications to the firmware that
implement obfuscation techniques and anti-forensics
behaviors. This includes alternative trigger methods
to initiate subversion of control that include: a rare
sequence of valid G-code commands, connection

handshakes, or malformed command calls. This also
includes support of false acknowledgments and
monitoring information that will accompany an
active attack. Research will also need to investigate
the effectiveness of minute modifications, from an
overall impact perspective, of varying the times, rates
and extruder feeds for multiple input environments.
Based on the initial proof of concept presented in
this paper, we plan to develop a full-fledged
firmware-based attack tool that will support scriptbased logic for complex trigger mechanisms and
manipulation logic. This should enable selective
(e.g., layer-based) modifications introduced into the
manufacturing process (e.g., presented in this paper
extrusion speed increment). This tool will further
implement extensive logging capabilities in order to
support post-production analysis. This firmwarebased tool will be used for the future research on
sabotage of a manufactured part’s quality as well as
on the detection of this category of attacks.
In addition, subsequent research will examine the
output for relevant residual data produced by the
software that could be useful in a digital forensics
examination of the hardware and software analysis
along with developing effective and efficient visual
indicators for the production product.
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